Designing Bidding Strategies for Autonomous Trading Agents by He, Minghua
University of Southampton Research Repository
ePrints Soton
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other 
copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial 
research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be 
reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing 
from the copyright holder/s. The content must not be changed in any way or sold 
commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the 
copyright holders.
  
 When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g.
AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full thesis title", University of Southampton, name 
of the University School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination
http://eprints.soton.ac.ukDESIGNING BIDDING STRATEGIES FOR
AUTONOMOUS TRADING AGENTS
By
Minghua HE
A thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
School of Electronics and Computer Science,
University of Southampton,
United Kingdom.
September 2004ABSTRACT
Increasingly many systems are being conceptualised, designed and implemented as mar-
ketplaces in which autonomous software entities (agents) trade services. These services
can be commodities in e-commerce applications or data and knowledge services in in-
formation economies. In such systems, dynamic pricing through some form of negoti-
ation or auction protocol is becoming the norm for many goods and customers. Thus, ne-
gotiation capabilities for software agents are a central concern. Speciﬁcally, agents need
to be able to prepare bids for and evaluate offers on behalf of the parties they represent
with the aim of obtaining the maximum beneﬁt for their users. They do this according to
some negotiation strategies. However, in many cases, determining which strategy to em-
ploy is a complex decision making task because of the inherent uncertainty and dynamics
of the situation. To this end, this thesis is concerned with developing bidding strategies
for a range of auction contexts.
Inthisthesis,wefocus onanumberofagentmediatede-commercesettings. In partic-
ular, we design novel strategies for the continuous double auctions, for the international
trading agent competition that involves multiple interrelated auctions, and for multiple
overlapping English auctions. All these strategies have been empirically benchmarked
against the main other models that have been proposed in the literature and, in all cases,
ourstrategieshavebeenshowntobesuperiorinawiderangeofcircumstances. Moreover
all our models exploit soft computing methods, in particular fuzzy logic and neuro-fuzzy
techniques. Such methodsareusedtocopewiththesigniﬁcantdegreesofuncertaintythat
exist in on-lineauctions and we show they are a practical solutionmethod for this class of
applications. In developing such strategies we believe this work represents an important
step towards realising the full potential of bidding agents in e-commerce scenarios.
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xof exploiting multiple auctions in this manner is something that is not really possible
without software agents. Given such huge and complex search spaces, the agent has a
number of interrelated tasks to perform: (i) monitor relevant auctions, (ii) compare and
make trade-offs between the offerings, (iii) decide in which auction to bid, (iv) when
to bid, (v) how many items to bid for and (vi) at what price to bid. However, to date
comparatively little work has been done in this area (see Sections 3.5, 4.4 and 5.6) and
so we also seek to develop new strategies for this case.
1.2 Research Aims
In designing bidding strategies for the auction scenarios we consider in this thesis, and
in many others besides, there are a number of common issues that need to be dealt with.
Moreover, we believe it is possible to identify a range of concepts and technologies that
form a solid foundation for tackling such problems in a broad range of situations. We
now consider each of these in turn.
First, an agent often needs to predict the closing price of an auction in order to de-
termine what bids or asks to make [Wellman et al., 2004]. In the multiple auction con-
text, such predictions are needed in order to determine which of the available auctions is
likely to be the best one to bid in. This procedure is usually based on some form of utility
analysis so that the auctions selected will maximise the likely return of the bidder (as
discussed in [Byde et al., 2002]). However, in order to calculate such returns, the likely
clearing price of each auction must be estimated ﬁrst.
Second, an agent needs to be adaptive so that it can tailor its bidding strategy to
reﬂect the environment in which it is situated. Being adaptive is particularly important
in cases where the environment is subject to signiﬁcant changes. These could happen,
for example, when the agent is trading with the same (or similar) partners or opponents
repeatedly. In such cases, the agent can adapt its behaviour according to the behaviour of
other agents so that it can obtain a better outcome for its owner. However, when things
change, perhaps becausetheagentneeds totradewithnewpartners, theparameters which
characterise the strategy need to be adapted again. This is hard to achieve by manually
adjusting the parameters since this is a slow and error-prone process and so it is desirable
if the agent can adapt itself on-line and automatically.
Third, the agent needs to be ﬂexible in generating and responding to bids. Speciﬁc-
ally, we mean that in many cases it is important for the agent to have a soft constraint
in bidding or matching a bid. For example, in a CDA, if a buyer agent is going to bid
1000, but the lowest ask in the market is 1001 then the agent may beneﬁt by relaxing its
constraint (slightly) and bidding the 0.1% higher that is necessary to make the trade.
Fourth, different users will have different attitudes to risk and these can, in turn, have
a signiﬁcant impact on the performance of the agent. Individual attitudes to risk can be
characterised according to how an agent approaches a fair gamble [Schotter, 1994]. A
6risk-seeking agent will prefer fair gambles to sure results, a risk-averse agent will take
minimal risks with its actions and so rejects fair gambles, and a risk-neutral agent is
indifferent if the sure result and the gamble have the same expected utilities. Even when
using the same strategy, the adoption of different risk attitudes can make a signiﬁcant
difference to the outcomes obtained. Speciﬁcally, in auction contexts we believe such
attitudes to risk should be inﬂuenced by the supply and demand within the market. The
more the demand, the more the competition, and a risk-averse attitude is more effective.
In contrast, the more the supply, the less the competition, and thus a risk-seeking attitude
will bring more proﬁt.
Fifth, an agent needs to be able to make trade-offs when participating in auctions
with multi-attribute goods or services [Luo et al., 2003b, Luo et al., 2003a]. This is be-
cause there will often be some form of conﬂict between the attributes of the goods. For
example, in a ﬂight auction where goods are described in terms of their price and travel
date, if a user wants to buy a cheap ticket, he needs to travel in the weekdays; however,
the ticket is much more expensiveat weekends. Given this, the agent needs some method
to make trade-offs between the different attributes.
Given these aims, this thesis uses a range of fuzzy techniques to cope with the in-
herent uncertainty present in all of these activities. This uncertainty can come from a
number of sources including the sellers, the bidders, the supply and demand quantity in
the market or even the time of bidding. Such factors are usually highly ambiguous and
fuzzy theory has proved itself to be effective in a range of applications with these charac-
teristics [Fraichard and Garnier, 2001, Yao and Yao, 2001, Mohammadi et al., 2000]. In
particular, we exploit fuzzy logic because of its intuitive nature and its embodiment in
fuzzy rules means that it should be readily comprehensible to the agent’s designers.
Against this background, this work is concerned with the design of bidding strategies
for a number of particular auction contexts. To start, we choose a single auction pro-
tocol, CDA, since it is a complex auction type that has no dominant strategy (the best
thing to do, irrespective of what the others do [Sandholm, 1999b]). This aspect of our
work involves developing a strategy that both a buyer agent and a seller agent can use.
Speciﬁcally, as a buyer, an agent needs to decide when to place a bid and at what price
and as a seller, an agent needs to decide when to place an ask and at what price. To
do these things effectively, an agent needs to (i) predict the likely transaction price at
which trades will occur; (ii) adapt itself to suit the prevailing market context because the
demand and supply in the market and other bidders’ strategies are changing; (iii) vary
its risk attitude in response to changes in the supply and demand so that it can deal with
different situations; and (iv) relax its constraints on price in order not to miss out on deals
by insigniﬁcant amounts.
Having developed a bidding strategy for a single auction, we turn to the more com-
plex problem of developing an agent that can bid across multiple auctions that may be
7operating different protocols. This is a sufﬁciently challenging and important problem
that an international competition was established in the area. In this Trading Agent Com-
petition (TAC), software agents compete against one another in 28 simultaneous auctions
in order to procure travel packages (ﬂights, hotels and entertainment) for a number of
customers. In this context, the failure to obtain some goods in one auction may lead to
the failure of a whole travel package. Thus, there is a strong need to co-ordinate bidding
across a range of interrelated auctions. In tackling this problem, we believe an effective
trading agent needs to: (i) estimate the likely closing prices of the various auctions; (ii)
adjust its bidding behaviour to suit environments in which the competition is more or
less strong; (iii) vary its risk attitude to achieve effective outcomes; (iv) make trade-offs
between buying ﬂights early at low prices, but before the corresponding hotels can be
guaranteed and buying ﬂight late with guaranteed hotels but at high ﬂight prices.
After dealing with the bidding issues in TAC, we wanted to generalise the multiple
auction context to consider the most common type of auction in e-commerce (the stand-
ard English auction). A bidding strategy for this scenario needs to be highly adaptive
because the market is very dynamic and uncertain due to the random number of auctions,
agents and goods. Speciﬁcally, it is important to adapt the parameters involved in the bid-
ding strategy so that the agent can adjust itself to suit the environment. Beside the feature
of adaptivity, the following features need to be considered when designing a strategy for
this context: (i) price prediction is important because the expected auction closing prices
are needed to select the auctions to bid in; (ii) the risk attitudes of the agent need to be
varied because the demand and supply are changing in the market; (iii) the agent needs
to have soft constraints when selecting the auctions to bid in because this will increase
the chances of obtaining the good in a good price; and (iv) trade-offs between the various
attributes need to be made because it is very unlikely to maximise each attribute value
when competing with other agents in the market.
1.3 Research Contributions
The work described in this thesis makes a number of important contributions to the state
of the art in the area of bidding strategies that autonomous trading agents can use in a
number of auction contexts. Speciﬁcally:
• We develop a novel fuzzy logic based bidding strategy that agents can use to parti-
cipate in CDAs [He et al., 2003]. The effectiveness of the strategy is demonstrated
by empirically benchmarking it against the main other strategies that have been
proposed in the literature and this evaluation shows our strategy is superior in a
wide range of situations.
• We develop novel fuzzy based bidding strategies that an agent can use to bid
across multiplesimultaneous auctions and purchase a number of interrelated goods
[He and Jennings, 2003, He and Jennings, 2004]. In both cases, the agents can
8vary their bidding behaviour according to their perception of the marketplace in
which they are currently operating. The effectiveness of these strategies is demon-
strated by our participation in the International Trading Agent Competition (in
2001 and 2002) in which our agent was the most successful participant over both
competitions.
• We develop and implement, for the ﬁrst time, a strategy that an agent can use to
buy multiple independent goods from multiple English auctions [He et al., 2004].
This strategy uses fuzzy set theory to ﬁnd the closest auctions to the optimal set to
bid in and neuro-fuzzy techniques that can adapt the parameters in its fuzzy neural
network through off-line and on-line learning. The effectiveness of the strategy is
empirically demonstrated in a ﬂight auction scenario and again we show our agent
obtains a higher overall satisfaction degree than the related strategies available in
the literature.
In addition to making advances in bidding strategies, this work is also one of the ﬁrst
to employ fuzzy theory (especially fuzzy logic and neuro-fuzzy techniques) in the area
of agent-mediated e-commerce (see Section 2.2.5 for a discussion of other work in this
area). In so doing, we further advance the claim that fuzzy techniques are a suitable tool
to address theuncertainty that is inherentin many aspects ofagent mediated e-commerce.
In more detail:
• Fuzzy reasoning is successfully used in predicting the closing prices of the auc-
tions. This can be observed from our work in predicting the closing prices of the
hotel and ﬂight auctions in the TAC and the various English auctions in the multi-
auction scenario. In the former case, the auctions are interrelated, and the factors
that are mainly related to the change of the hotel auction’s closing prices are used
in the fuzzy rules (Section 4.2.7). In the latter case, fuzzy reasoning rules are real-
ised through a neuro-fuzzy network, however, the principle of the reasoning is the
same. The main factors are expressed as fuzzy sets which correspond to neurons
of the lowest layer of the network (Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2).
• Fuzzy techniques are used to enable our agents to adapt their bidding behaviour
and strategy to better ﬁt their prevailing circumstances. In our work, there is a
progress from somewhat limited adaptation to highly ﬂexible adaptation. In our
work on CDAs, the adaptation is based on the frequency of transactions made by
the agent and its aim is to change the risk attitude of the agent. Speciﬁcally, if the
agent waits too long to conduct a deal, it will adapt its risk attitude to take less
risk because it means its price constraint is far away from the market transaction
price; on the other hand, if the agent transacts very frequently, it will adapt its risk
attitude toward being more risky because it means the agent can make more proﬁt
by raising its threshold. This adaptation is somewhat limited because an agent
can only vary its learning rate (Section 3.4). In the TAC, the agent has a number
9Given this analysis of the state of the art, we decided to concentrate on the strategy
design highlighted in Section 2.2.5. As already discussed, this is a key aspect of agent-
mediated e-commerce and one that has many different facets. Thus the remainder of
this thesis focuses on the issue of designing effective and practical strategies for agents
that participate in a variety of different auction settings. In more detail, this thesis ﬁrst
concentrates on developing a strategy for a particular auction setting. To demonstrate the
power of the agent-based approach the CDA is chosen (Chapter 3). This is a reasonably
common type of auction (see Section 2.2.5), but is sufﬁciently complex that it has no
optimal strategy that can be pre-computed. Having successfully developed an agent for
this scenario, we then focus on the more complex multipleauction setting where an agent
tries to bid across multiple simultaneous auctions in order to procure a number of goods
(Chapters 4 and 5).
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Figure 3.6: Performance of agents with different strategies.
The horizontal axis represents the demand (or supply) conﬁguration of the
corresponding market and the vertical axis represents the total proﬁt of the
corresponding agent using a speciﬁc strategy in one session. There are 5 s-agents and 5
b-agents in each experiment. In (a)&(b), supply is equal to demand, the unit of good
that each agent is endowed with to buy (sell) increases from session to session in the
range [5,15], the total supply (demand) is shown in the horizontal axis. In (c)&(d),
supply is less than demand, the unit of good that each s-agent is endowed with is ﬁxed
to 5, and the unit of good for b-agents increases from session to session in the range
[6,14]. In (e)&(f), supply is greater than demand, the unit of good that each b-agent is
endowed with is ﬁxed to 5, and the unit of good for s-agents increases from session to
session in the range [6,14].
57the market does not decrease signiﬁcantly. That is, even in the worst case the efﬁciency
is still reasonably high. The market with all A-FL-agents is also investigated. In this
market, all the agents use the A-FL strategy, and the efﬁciency is 85.45% for a market
with 5 s-agents and 5 b-agents. This ﬁgure is still reasonable with respect to experiments
shown in Tables 3.5 to 3.7. Thus we can conclude that widespread adoption of the A-
FL strategy does not lead to a signiﬁcant deterioration in the effectiveness of the overall
market.
Table 3.5: Efﬁciency statistics when demand=supply.
Number Number
of A-FL Proﬁt Efﬁci of A-FL Proﬁt Efﬁci
b-agent -ency s-agent -ency
0 29,463 96.92% 0 29,463 96.92%
1 29,267 96.27% 1 29,280 96.32%
2 29,560 97.24% 2 29,155 95.91%
3 29,575 97.29% 3 29,283 96.33%
4 29,446 96.86% 4 29,136 95.84%
5 29,103 95.73% 5 28,781 94.67%
6 29,086 95.68% 6 28,332 93.20%
7 29,028 95.49% 7 27,510 90.49%
8 28,449 93.58% 8 26,045 85.67%
Table 3.6: Efﬁciency statistics when demand<supply.
Number Number
of A-FL Proﬁt Efﬁci of A-FL Proﬁt Efﬁci
b-agent -ency s-agent -ency
0 31,972 94.04% 0 31,972 94.04%
1 32,592 95.86% 1 31,776 93.46%
2 32,971 96.97% 2 31,751 93.39%
3 33,071 97.11% 3 32,140 94.53%
4 32,994 97.04% 4 32,020 94.18%
5 32,909 96.79% 5 32,201 94.71%
6 32,899 96.76% 6 32,081 94.36%
7 32,941 96.89% 7 31,971 94.03%
8 32,860 96.65% 8 30,843 90.71%
9 29,454 86.63%
10 28,267 83.14%
3.5 Related Work
There are a number of strands of work that are related to what we have described in this
chapter. Firstly, the work on bidding strategies for various forms of auctions. Secondly,
the work on using fuzzy techniques to manage an agent’s interactions (see Section 2.2.5
for the discussion of bilateral negotiations). Finally, alternatives to fuzzy reasoning for
coping with the uncertainties in bidding.
66Table 3.7: Efﬁciency statistics when demand>supply.
Number Number
of A-FL Proﬁt Efﬁci of A-FL Proﬁt Efﬁci
b-agent -ency s-agent -ency
0 31,444 86.86% 0 31,444 86.86%
1 31,504 87.03% 1 31,345 86.59%
2 31,480 86.96% 2 31,334 86.56%
3 31,448 86.87% 3 31,285 86.42%
4 31,448 86.87% 4 31,195 86.17%
5 31,316 86.51% 5 31,045 85.76%
6 31,029 85.72% 6 30,808 85.10%
7 30,998 85.63% 7 30,487 84.22%
8 30,961 85.53% 8 29,041 80.22%
9 30,598 84.52%
10 30,332 83.79%
Non-cooperative game theory is an important tool for analysing strategic interactions
between agents [Kreps, 1990]. However, one of its weaknesses is that the theory is only
suitable for highly stylised, simple settings [Jennings et al., 2001], thus a clear game-
theoretic solution to the CDA problem is not possible. The Recursive Modelling Method
[Vidal and Durfee, 1996] has been proposed as an approach for an agent to reason about
other agents and generate an appropriate strategy for negotiation. However, in most prac-
ticalcases, theagentcanonlybuildﬁnitenestingmodelsduetothelimitationofacquiring
knowledge. Thus with this approach, not all the information in the recursive model may
be relevant to the agent and it is possible that little or no information may be available for
the agent to use. Park, Durfee and Birmingham [Park et al., 1999] propose the adaptive
agent bidding strategy (called the p-strategy) based on stochastic modelling for a CDA.
The idea of the p-strategy is to model the auction process using a Markov Chain (MC).
However, in many cases, it is hard to obtain the probability values required for the MC
model, such as the transition probabilities and the probabilities of success and failure for
particular trading actions. Moreover, the computation involved in this approach is large.
Badea [Badea, 2000] applied Inductive Logic Programming (ILP) to induce trading rules
for a CDA. He ﬁrst identiﬁed buy (sell) opportunities from historical market data. Then,
these buy (sell) opportunities are input as examples to an ILP learner to produce under-
standable rules. However, this learning strategy relies heavily on historical data which is
often not available in the contexts we consider.
Finally, we consider the alternatives to fuzzy reasoning for handling uncertainty in
agent interactions (see [Luo et al., 2001] for a comprehensive survey about handling un-
certainty in agent systems). As stated, we chose fuzzy logic based methods because
they have proven to be a practicable solution in solving decision making problems under
uncertainty (e.g., [Fraichard and Garnier, 2001, Yao and Yao, 2001, Tan and Tang, 2001,
67Mohammadi et al., 2000]). Fuzzy rules are the most visible manifestation of this ap-
proach and have been successfully used in industrial applications, manufacturing, pro-
cess control, automotive control, and ﬁnancial trading [Yen, 1999]. There are, however,
alternative techniques for handling uncertainties. For example, the possibility based ap-
proach [Gim´ enez-Funes et al., 1998, Matos and Sierra, 1998] has been used to perform
multi-agent reasoning under uncertainty for bilateral negotiation. In this work, uncer-
tainties due to the lack of knowledge about other agents’ behaviours are modelled by
possibility distributions. Based on information from a case base of previous negotiation
behaviours, the possibility distributions are generated by choosing the most similar situ-
ation to the current context and the most similar price from the case base. Since this
approach relies on a case base, it is unclear what would happen if no highly similar
situations were available. Moreover, even if a similar case exists, it is possible that the
strategy used successfully in that situation does not work in the current environment due
tothevarietyofcompetitors. TheBayesianlearningmethod[Zeng and Sycara, 1998]has
also been used toexplicitlymodelmulti-issuenegotiationin asequentialdecisionmaking
model. In this work, a Bayesian network is used to update the knowledge and belief each
agent has about the environment and other agents, and offers and counter-offers between
agents during bilateral negotiations are generated based on Bayesian probabilities. How-
ever, this method is inappropriate in our context because assigning prior probabilities of
a bid (ask) being accepted is difﬁcult given the dynamism and uncertainty of the CDA
context.
3.6 Summary
This chapter developed new algorithms that guide an agent’s buying and selling beha-
viour in a CDA. The FL-strategy uses heuristic fuzzy rules and a fuzzy reasoning mech-
anism to decide what bids or asks to place. We then extended this strategy so that the
agent could adapt its bidding behaviour to its prevailing market context. In both cases
we benchmarked the performance of our algorithm against the most prominent alternat-
ives available in the literature. This evaluation showed the superior performance of our
method. This result is especially promising since the benchmark strategies have been
shown to outperform human bidders in experimental settings [Kephart, 2002]. Speak-
ing more generally, we also believe that the development of efﬁcient and practicable al-
gorithms for bidding behaviour increase the opportunities of using CDAs as the auction
protocol for on-line marketplaces. We, therefore, view our contribution as an important
step in this direction.
In more detail, the experiments in Section 3.3.2 show how to select the appropriate
risk attitude for an agent in different situations. The result is consistent with our conjec-
ture: if supply (demand) quantity is greater than demand (supply) quantity, an s-agent
68(b-agent) with an averse attitude towards risk can make more proﬁt. This is also con-
sistent with our discussions of the risk attitude in Section 1.2. Based on this selection
principle, the experiment in Section 3.3.3 shows that the FL-strategy outperforms some
of the most commonly used bidding strategies in a range of situations. Since agents often
have no prior knowledge of the relation between supply and demand, it is not always
possible to tell in advance what kind of attitude an agent should have. Thus adaptive FL-
agents are introduced (recall that we discussed adaptation in Section 3.3.3) which can
tailor their strategy to the supply (demand) of the market. Through the experiments in
Section 3.4.1, we ﬁnd that the learning rate which is adjusted in small steps behaves best
in an environment in which the supply and demand do not change abruptly. The exper-
iments in Section 3.4.2 show that A-FL-agents always outperform other benchmarking
strategy agents in various situations. The transaction price distribution of agents using
different strategies shows that an A-FL-agent always sells (buys) goods at higher (lower)
prices than agents using other strategies. Finally, in Section 3.4.3 we investigate to what
extent the behaviour of A-FL-agents and the efﬁciency of the CDA market are affected
by the increasing use of A-FL-agents. This investigation reveals that the proﬁt of an indi-
vidual A-FL-agent decreases at ﬁrst and then increases steadily. We also show that with
an increase in the number of A-FL-agents, the efﬁciency of the market is not signiﬁcantly
affected.
Aswellasbeingeffective,webelievetheFL strategyispracticalforbuildingautonom-
ous agents for CDAs. The strategy we employ is intuitive and its embodiment in fuzzy
rules means that it should be readily comprehensible to the agent’s owner (as have other
similarapplicationsoffuzzy rules [Sosnowski, 2000, Yam and Koczy, 2000]). Moreover,
the information required by the strategy can be readily obtained by monitoring market
activities, such as the outstanding ask, the outstanding bid, and the accepted bids or asks
in past transactions. In particular, this procedure does not require any information of the
cost or valuation of other agents (cf. some of the approaches discussed in Section 3.2).
Having shown that agents can be developed for a particular auction setting, we now
turn to the more complex problem of an agent bidding across multiple, concurrent auc-
tions. However, this CDA work brings forward a number of important intuitions and
insights (as well as speciﬁc technologies) to the multiple auction setting. Firstly, and
most directly, the idea of using a reference price and of fuzzifying the relation with this
reference price is used in the entertainment auctions of the trading agent competition
(which are a CDA). Secondly, the idea of exploiting fuzzy reasoning techniques is also
adopted in the hotel auctions of the competition, where there is a need for an efﬁcient
reasoning procedure. Finally, there is the importance of adapting bidding behaviour to
the prevailing context in order to cope with dynamics and unpredictability.
69situation for SouthamptonTAC is when all the players are like itself. This is because the
competitive tendency of the agents causes the hotel prices to rise to moderate levels and
then many of the agents change their customers’ travel plans at approximately the same
time. This switching behaviour causes the counterpart hotel prices to rise (because of
increased competition) and the agents to have unused ﬂights or hotel rooms bought on
account of their previous travel plans. For RS-agents, as shown in Figure 4.9, the results
also support Conjecture 2. RS-agents behave very well in non-competitive games and
their performance decreases rapidly as the number of RS-agents increases. This happens
because as more agents bid aggressively, the hotel closing prices get higher. RA-agents
behave best in competitive environments when there are many RS-agents, perform ad-
equately in non-competitive games and worst in semi-competitive games when there are
a few RS-agents and SouthamptonTAC agents (see Figure 4.10). In the latter two cases,
RA-agents change theircustomers’travel packages reasonablyoften and thiscauses them
to buy extra hotels and ﬂights that they cannot subsequently use.
Figure 4.9: Performance of risk-seeking agents in different environments.
Figure 4.10: Performance of risk-averse agents in different environments.
Moreover, from Figures 4.8 to 4.10, we ﬁnd that the range of scores for each kind of
agentaredifferent; forSouthamptonTACitis[1372,3737],forRS-agents itis[−2742,2374]
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Figure 4.11: Relative performance of the agents in different environments.
Furthermore, Table 4.16 shows the difference between the predicted and actual hotel
closing prices for the order in which they closed in the ﬁnal. For example, for the hotel
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Figure 5.6: Learning curve: root mean square error versus time.
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Figure 5.7: Comparing antecedent membership functions (MFs) before (dashed line) and
after (solid line) off-line learning.
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Figure 5.8: Comparing consequent membership functions before (dashed line) and after
(solid line) off-line learning.
are lower than the initial ones. In contrast, in Figure 5.12, when supply is low, the
closing prices tend to be high, and the consequent parameters are higher than the initial
121parameters.
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Figure 5.9: Comparing antecedent membership functions (MFs) before (dashed line) and
after (solid line) off-line learning in high supply environment.
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Figure 5.10: Comparing consequent membership functions before (dashed line) and after
(solid line) off-line learning in high supply environment.
5.5 Empirical Evaluation
This section evaluates the FNN agent by comparing it in a variety of environments, with
other agents that use bidding strategies proposed in the literature. In particular we are
interested in assessing the performance of each kind of agent in different environments.
There are three main groups of experiments and there are a number of sessions which
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Figure 5.13: Performance of agent with various agent populations.
The horizontal axis shows the total auction number in the market. The vertical axis
represents the performance of the kind of agents in that session. The number on top of
each bar is the number of transactions made per agent by that kind of agents in the
session. In (a) there are 8 agents in total and 10 for (b) to (e).
From this, it can be seen that the FNN agents perform better than AVG agents in
most cases considered. We attribute this success to their ability to be able to select the
auctions to bid in according to the relatively correct prediction on the closing prices of
the auctions. The FNN agent is better than GRD agents in most cases except in (e) where
there is a high supply and 40% AVG agents. This is because in this case there are many
agents that use the ECF strategy. Thus, it is likely to be the case that a number of FNN
agents and AVG agents are waiting for speciﬁc auctions to bid and some of them failed
to obtain the goods. The GRD agent endeavours to make a transaction whenever it can.
Its main shortcoming is that it only considers ongoing auctions (it ignores those that have
not yet started and so fails to consider the full set of potential purchasing opportunities
when making bidding decisions). Thus, it sometimes buys a good at the user’s valuation
price, when, if it waited, it may well ﬁnd subsequent auctions with lower closing prices.
12515 20 25
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Number of auctions
P
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
(a) Using Average Operator
2.1
1.7
2.1
2.4
2.6
2.5
2.9
2.6
2.6
risk−seeking
risk−neutral
risk−averse
15 20 25
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
Number of auctions
P
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
(b) Using Einstein Operator
2.0
1.9 1.8
2.6
2.4 2.3
3.0
2.5
2.4
risk−seeking
risk−neutral
risk−averse
15 20 25
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Number of auctions
P
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
(c) Using Uninorm Operator
1.8
2.0 1.9
2.4 2.4
2.2
2.7 2.7 2.6
risk−seeking
risk−neutral
risk−averse
Figure 5.16: Performance of FNN agents with different risk attitudes.
5.6 Related Work
There are several strands of work that are directly related to what we have described
in this chapter. There is work on agents bidding in multiple overlapping auctions (which
has already been discussed in Section 4.4)and work on using fuzzy techniques to manage
agent interactions (which has also been discussed previously (in Section 3.5). The related
work which has not yet been considered is that on multi-attribute auctions [Che, 1993,
Bichler et al., 1999, Jennings et al., 2000a, David et al., 2002] (Section 2.3.3). However,
in these works, the buyer is the auctioneer who calls for bids along multiple attributes
from sellers, whilein ourwork thesellers are theauctioneers. Thereare multipleauctions
inourcontextwheretheyhaveoneauction. Ouragentbidsonpriceonlyalthoughitneeds
to consider multiple attributes while the agents in these works needs bid on multiple
attributes.
5.7 Summary
This chapter developed a new algorithm that guides an agent’s bidding behaviour in mul-
tiple overlapping English auctions for multipleitems characterised by multipleattributes.
The Earliest Closest First algorithm we developed ﬁrst calculates the auctions that best
ﬁt the users’ preferences and then bids in order of increasing end time in any auctions
that have a satisfaction degree that is reasonably close to the best ones. Speciﬁcally, the
FNN strategy uses neuro-fuzzy techniques to predict the expected closing prices of the
English auctions and to determine which auction the agent should bid in at what time.
The use of a fuzzy neural network also allows the decision making criteria of our agent to
129be adapted to the situation in which it ﬁnds itself. The adaptation is based on the learning
of the neural network where the parameters in the fuzzy sets and consequent output can
be adjusted. Moreover, we benchmarked our algorithm against two common alternatives
available in the literature and the strategy which also uses ECF but with a different pre-
diction function. In most cases we considered, the FNN strategy is superior to the others.
This shows the effectiveness of the ECF and the adaptation ability of the FNN agent.
Our algorithm can also make trade-offs in its bidding behaviour between the different
attributes that characterise the desired good in order to maximise the user’s satisfaction.
130the number of risk seeking agents is large). It also performs well in non-competitive
environments because it can adapt its strategy to bid aggressively for the goods it wants.
To build a more general multiple auction model and improve the preference repres-
entation of the customer, we focused on the problem of an agent bidding across multiple,
simultaneous English auctions. For this case, an Earliest Closest First algorithm was
proposed that bids in the auctions which have a close satisfaction degree with what are
believed to be the optimal set. To realise this algorithm, we designed an agent that uses
neuro-fuzzy techniques to predict the expected closing prices of the auctions. The para-
meters involved in the strategy can be adapted according to standard learning algorithms
in neural networks. Thus, our agent is able to adapt its bidding strategy to reﬂect the type
of environment in which it is situated. As before, we compared our agent with a range of
other strategies from the literature (in a ﬂight auction scenario). The result shows that, in
most cases, the FNN agents outperform other strategies.
Looking back at the research aims outlined in Section 1.2, the research objectives that
were laid out have been met:
• We successfully used fuzzy reasoning methods (Sections 4.2.7 and 5.3.1) to pre-
dict the auctions’ likely closing prices in a dynamic market. The effectiveness of
both agents show that the prediction is sufﬁciently accurate to make reasonable
decisions.
• All the agents’ strategies were adaptive to some degree. The CDA agent (Section
3.4)adaptsitsbiddingbehaviouraccordingtothetransactionfrequency,Southamp-
tonTAC (Section 4.2.8) adapts its behaviour between three different kinds of TAC
environments, and the FNN agent (Section 5.3.2), which exhibits the greatest de-
greeofadaptivity,canvarytheparametersinvolvedinthebiddingstrategytoreﬂect
the environment in which it is situated.
• The agents bid ﬂexibly and relax their constraints where appropriate. Both the
CDA agent and SouthamptonTAC realised this in the bidding in a continuous
double auction (Sections 3.2.2 and 4.2.6). Flexible bidding was shown in the earli-
est closest ﬁrst strategy of the FNN Agent (Section 5.2) by the fact that it chooses
the closest auctions to the optimal set to bid in.
• The attitudes towards risk are varied in all the agents (Sections 3.3.2, 4.2.8 and 5.2)
and we found it had a signiﬁcant beneﬁcial impact on their performance.
• Both SouthamptonTAC (Section 4.2.5) and the FNN agent (Section 5.3.3) were
able to make trade-offs when bidding in auctions.
In addition to developing the strategies themselves, we also believe that our work
is signiﬁcant both for the areas of agent-mediated e-commerce and fuzzy logic. In the
former case, we developed novel bidding strategies for a number of auction contexts.
In the latter case, we showed how fuzzy logic can be employed in agent-mediated e-
commerce settings. Speciﬁcally, fuzzy logic theory and fuzzy neuro-network techniques
132types (including Vickrey, Dutch and First-Price Sealed Bid auctions). In this case,
the decision problem is more complicated since each auction protocol has its own
price updates rules and it will involve more fuzzy sets and fuzzy rules.
135